Cloud computing is an emerging technology that allows to access computing resources on a pay-per-use basis. The main challenges in this area are the efficient performance management and the energy costs minimization.
Introduction
Cloud computing is an emerging paradigm that aims at streamlining the on-demand provisioning of flexible and scalable services accessible through the Internet [24] . The main idea is to supply users with on-demand access to computing or storage resources and charge fees for their usage. In these models, users pay only for the resources they use and they can access software applications (Software as a Service -SaaS), tools for the development and deployment of Cloud-based applications (Platform as a ServicePaaS) or even low level hardware physical resources (Infrastructure as a Service -IaaS).
In the SaaS paradigm, applications are available over the Web. The SaaS provider hosts both the application and the data, hence the end-user is able to use and access the service from all over the world. With PaaS, applications are developed and deployed on platforms transparently managed by the Cloud provider. The platform typically includes databases, middleware, and also development tools. In IaaS systems, virtual computer environments are provided as services and servers, storage, and network equipment can be outsourced by customers without the expertise to operate them.
Many companies (e.g., Google, Amazon, and Microsoft) are offering Cloud computing services such as Google's App Engine and Amazon's Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) or Microsoft Windows Azure. Large data centers provide the infrastructure behind the Cloud, and virtualization technology (which allows the execution of multiple virtual machines on the same physical machine) makes Cloud computing resources more efficient and cost-effective both for providers and customers. Indeed, end-users obtain the benefits of the infrastructure without the need to implement and administer it directly adding or removing capacity almost instantaneously on a "pay-as-you-use" basis. On the other hand, Cloud providers can maximize the utilization of their physical resources also obtaining economies of scale.
The development of efficient service provisioning policies is among the major issues in Cloud research. Indeed, modern Clouds operate in a new and dynamic world, characterized by continuous changes in the environment and in the system and performance requirements that must be satisfied. Continuous changes occur without warning and in an unpredictable manner, and are outside the control of the Cloud provider. Therefore, advanced solutions need to be developed that manage the Cloud system in a dynamically adaptive fashion, while continuously providing service and performance guarantees. Recent studies [14, 17, 24] have shown that the main challenges for Cloud systems are the reduction of costs and the improvements of performance levels.
Information Technology (IT) analysts state that at the end of 2012, up to 40% of the budgets of Cloud service centers are devoted to energy costs [18, 28] . Service centers investment grew by 22.1% during 2012 and it is expected it will further grow by another 14 .5% in 2013 [25] . Energy efficiency is therefore one of the main focal points on which resource management should be concerned. In addition, providers need to comply with Service Level Agreement (SLA) contracts that determine the revenues gained and penalties incurred on the basis of the level of performance achieved. Quality of Service (QoS) guarantees have to be satisfied despite workload fluctuations, which could span several orders of magnitude within the same business day [17, 18] .
The recent development of Cloud systems and the rapid growth of the Internet have led to a remarkable usage of game-theoretic tools. Problems arising in the IT industry, such as quality of service or resource allocation, pricing, and load shedding, can not be handled with classical optimization approaches because each player can be affected by the actions of all players, not only by his own actions. In this setting, a natural modeling framework involves seeking an equilibrium or stable operating point for the system, provided that it exists. More precisely, each player seeks to optimize his own goal, which depends on the strategies of the other players upon his own, and this optimization is performed simultaneously by different players. An equilibrium (in the sense of Nash) is reached when no player can improve his objective function by changing unilaterally his strategy. A survey of different modeling and solution concepts of networking games, as well as a number of different applications in telecommunications and wireless networks, based on game theory, can be found in [2] .
In Cloud computing, game theory methods have been used to provide load balancing and resource allocation solutions. A number of papers consider centralized and decentralized load balancing strategies in a system with parallel servers (see [7, 29] and the references therein). The requests arrive as a Poisson process, and the service time of incoming jobs is assumed to be known. For such system, the load balancing problem is investigated in two different scenarios: (i) a centralized setting leading to a global optimization problem, in which a dispatcher decides where each job will get service soas to minimize the weighted mean number of jobs in the system, and (ii) a distributed non-cooperative setting leading to a non-cooperative game transformed into a standard convex optimization problem. The paper studies structural properties of both strategies, and the efficiency loss in terms of Price of Anarchy (PoA) [30] of the decentralized scheme relative to the global optimal (centralized) one.
In [41] , the authors propose a pricing mechanism for resource allocation in a utility computing system among competing end-users requests. The fixed available service capacity is allocated among the different flows proportionally to their monetary bids. The paper studies the resulting equilibrium point, establishes convergence of a best-response algorithm, and bounds the efficiency loss of this distributed mechanism. More precisely:
End-users requests are represented as job flows in a controlled queueing system. These jobs arrive to the system through a fixed, random process, are stored in a buffer, and then are serviced by the resource in a first come, first served manner. The service rate is set through a proportional share mechanism. Within this framework, the interactions between end-users are modeled as a game. Then, authors show that the equilibrium can be reached in a distributed, asynchronous manner. The paper also reports the sensitivity analysis with respect to the variation of problem's parameters (e.g., load intensity and relative importance of the competing user requests). Differently from our point of view, in [41] the problem of the resource allocation is considered for a single virtualized server among competing user requests, while in this paper we consider the Cloud data center at a higher granularity (i.e., VMs).
In this paper we take the perspective of SaaS providers which host their applications at a PaaS provider. Each SaaS provider wants to maximize its profit while complying with QoS requirements of their end-users, which determine the revenues and the penalties on the basis of the achieved performance level. The profit of the SaaS is given by the revenues from SLAs minus the cost sustained for using the resources supplied by the PaaS. The profit maximization is challenging since on-line services see dynamic workloads that fluctuate over multiple time scales [17, 22] . Resources have to be allocated flexibly at run-time according to workload fluctuations. Furthermore, each SaaS behaves selfishly and competes with others SaaSs for the use of resources supplied by the PaaS.
The PaaS, in its turn, wants to maximize the revenues obtained providing the resources.
The profits are given by the revenues from the SLA with the SaaSs minus the energy 4 costs sustained for running physical servers.
To capture the behavior of SaaSs and PaaS in this conflicting situation, we will model the run-time service provisioning problem as a Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem (GNEP) (see e.g. [16, 19, 23, 26, 37] ), which is an extension of the classical Nash equilibrium problem [35] , in which both the objective function and the feasible region of each player depend on the strategies chosen by the other players. We then use results from game theory to develop efficient algorithms for the run-time management and allocation of PaaS resources to competing SaaSs.
In [10, 11] , we have considered a problem similar to the one faced here, analysing the service provisioning problem with on spot resources. With respect to our previous work, in this paper we extend the game-theoretic model considering a new and more realistic pricing model regulating SaaS and PaaS contract. Furthermore, we explicitly model energy costs of the PaaS infrastructure which requires to include additional decision variables and a totally different solution approach.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the problem under study. In Section 3, we introduce our model based on the concept of Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE); moreover, we prove the existence of a potential function for the game and of social optimum solutions. In Section 4, we prove that the social optimum problem is convex and we derive some properties of social optima from the corresponding Karush-Kuhn-Tucker system. In Section 5, we provide a solution algorithm based on the best reply dynamics and we prove its convergence to GNE. The experimental results discussed in Section 6 demonstrate the efficiency of our algorithm by varing its initial solution. Conclusions are finally drawn in Section 7.
Problem Description
We consider SaaS providers using Cloud computing facilities according to the PaaS paradigm to offer multiple transactional Web-Services (WSs), each service representing a different application. Each SaaS provider signs with its customers an SLA contract specifying: (i) the QoS levels that it must meet while responding to end-user requests for a given application, and
(ii) the corresponding pricing scheme. In particular, we assume SaaSs have to guarantee to their end-users that the average response time when accessing application k is less than or equal to a given threshold R S k , while the per-request revenue for the SaaS is α k (see Figure 1 ).
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End-user-SaaS SLA SaaS-PaaS SLA In turn, each SaaS provider signs an SLA contract with the PaaS: The PaaS must guarantee that the average response time for WS application k is less than or equal to R P k (≤ R S k ). Furthermore, for the execution of a single request k ∈ A s , SaaS s pays a fee β k to the PaaS. The SaaS per-request revenue α k is greater than or equal to m k β k , where m k > 1 is the SaaS margin for the execution of individual requests. Both R P k and β k may vary with the time of the day. Therefore, the SaaS can ask the PaaS provider to 6 reduce its application response time to improve the final end-user experience and thus to increase the loyalty of its customers. However, intuitively, the more stringent are the performance requirements imposed by the SaaS, the higher is the number of resources devoted by the PaaS to the SaaS and overall the higher is the per-request fee β k payed by the SaaS. In particular, we assume that the average response times R P k enters the SaaS payoff function with a linear function, U k = δ s (R S k − R P k ). Linear functions are a flexible mechanism to express the discontent of final end-users as a function of response times and have been widely used in the literature (see e.g. [12, 15, 38] ).
Current Cloud platforms are based on virtualization technology, which allows a flexible management of the overall intrastructure. Therefore, we assume that applications are executed in virtual machines (VMs), which are dynamically instantiated by the PaaS provider. We make the simplifying assumption that each VM hosts a single WS application. Multiple VMs implementing the same WS application can also run in parallel. We also assume that physical servers are dedicated to SaaS providers, i.e. every physical server runs the VMs of the same SaaS. Cloud users usually prefer dedicated servers especially for business critical applications and/or when security requirements are of paramount importance. The use of dedicated servers is becoming widespread in the Cloud market [3] . For example, Amazon has devoted specific data centers to run applications for US government agencies and contractors [5] .
For simplicity, we assume that physical servers are homogeneous, having the same processing capacity C. However, our framework can be extended relaxing this latter assumption. In the following, N P denotes the total number of physical servers used for the dedicated execution of WS applications at the PaaS site.
On each physical servers, we assume that SaaS VMs are replicated with a fixed pattern for fault-tolerance reasons [8] (e.g., for every DBMS instance, two instances of application servers and three instances of web servers are allocated) and if any additional physical server is needed, VMs are replicated on the new server according to this fixed allocation pattern. In the following, we will denote by v sk the proportion of VMs for WS application k hosted by one server dedicated to SaaS s.
The number of physical servers that the PaaS decides to supply to SaaS provider s is denoted by N s . Since the workload of Internet applications can vary by orders of magnitude within the same business day [17] , the physical servers are dynamically allocatedby the PaaS provider periodically, e.g., every hour, according to a short-term workload prediction. One hour is also the time unit which is usually adopted by PaaS and IaaS to bill the use of resources to their customers [4] . We denote by Λ k the prediction for the arrival rate of WS application k.
In this context, each SaaS provider can make the decision of accepting or rejecting a WS application execution request to maximize its own revenue. In other terms, SaaS providers can implement an admission control scheme trading off between the platform costs and the revenues they gain from their customers [1] . We assume that such decisions are taken according to some i.i.d. probabilistic law. The resulting application execution rate (or throughput, acceptance rate) is denoted by X k ≤ Λ k . SaaS providers may possibly incur in penalties p k ≥ 0 upon rejection of request executions of k. In order to fix the rejection rate above a fixed threshold and guarantee a minimum availability, SaaS s may decide to guarantee a minimum throughput λ k .
We assume that each physical server runs a Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) configured in work-conserving mode. The resource allocation mechanism implemented by VMMs can be modeled as a first approximation by the Generalized Processor Sharing (GPS) [36] scheduling (see e.g. [20, 39] ). Under GPS, the fraction of the available processing capacity of each server devoted to WS application k at time t is:
where φ sk denotes the CPU share, or weight, of application k of the SaaS provider s, and K(t) ⊆ A s is the set of WS applications with waiting requests at time t.
To estimate the per-request mean response time achieved with the GPS mechanism, we adopt the approximation proposed in [8, Formula (18) ]. Under the assumption that the requests of a given application are evenly distributed among the physical servers in a probabilistic manner, the mean response time for application k can be approximated by
where X k /N s is the arrival rate of application-k requests to one physical server of SaaS s (requests are evenly distributed among the N s physical servers), µ k denotes the maximum service rate of a capacity-one server for executing a class k request, ρ sk
is interpreted as the "utilization" of application k requests, and ρ s def = l∈A s v sl ρ sl . Formula 2 renders the mean response time of a virtual machine when the VMM uses the GPS mechanism described above; we point the interested reader to [8] for further details.
It is shown in [8, Theorem 5] that the mean response time of all SaaS-s applications, that is
where R k is given by (2), is minimized when φ sk = ρ sk , for all k ∈ A s . We assume that
PaaSs make this choice for the CPU shares, which implies that the average WS application k response time becomes (upon substitution in (2) and noting that l∈A s v sl = 1)
Such choice of the weights induce a fair load-balancing among the number of on-going WS execution requests. In fact, (3) implies that the number on-going WS execution requests of application k, which is R k X k /N s by Little's law [32] , is independent of k.
Remark 1.
In the remainder of the paper, we use (3) as model of the response time of application k requests on PaaS s. However, part of the results presented below immediately follow by only using the convexity of R k . This lets us stipulate that they hold also for a wider class of response time functions.
Finally, we denote by c the time unit cost for a physical server when it is turned on, including its power consumption and cooling overhead [28] . Table 1 summarizes the notation used in this paper for quick reference. Note that, the SaaS SLA contract parameters (e.g., R S k or p k ) are usually public available and stored in public registries [13] . Requests arrival rates and resource demands (i.e., Λ k , µ k ) can be determined by SaaS and PaaS by prediction methods or monitoring [6, 9] . Vice versa, platform parameters (e.g., servers time unit costs c and the overall number of servers available N) are known only by the PaaS. Hence, the PaaS has or can determine easily the full knowledge of the system parameters. 
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Game-theoretic Model
As discussed in Section 1, the goal of the PaaS is to maximize its revenues obtained from the execution of SaaS applications minus the cost incurred with the use of thephysical servers.
On the other hand, the goal of each SaaS provider is to maximize its payoff which considers the profits obtained from the execution of incoming requests, the costs incurred for the use of the platform and the penalties associated with request rejections. Each
SaaS payoff function finally includes also a linear term which takes into account, for each application-k request, the impact of the response time R P k on the end-user loyalties and expresses the discontent of final end-users experiencing large response times.
As it will be detailed in the following, the behavior of the PaaS and the SaaSs in this conflicting situation can be modeled as a GNEP. Section 3.1 formulates the PaaS resource allocation problem, while Section 3.2 formalizes SaaS providers optimization problems. The Generalized Nash equilibria of the game which is originated with this setting are defined in Section 3.3 and a potential function for the game is described in Section 3.4.
Game formulation from the PaaS side
The PaaS optimization problem is:
subject to:
The first and second terms of the payoff function are the revenues for the execution of end-user requests and the costs of using physical servers, respectively. Constraint family (5) guarantees each SaaS with a margin for the execution of end-user requests (m k > 1). Constraint (6) entails that the total number of servers adopted is lower than the one available. Constraints (7) guarantee that the average response time for requestsexecution satisfies the SLA between PaaS and SaaSs. Finally, constraint family (8) guarantees that physical servers resources are not saturated.
In the formulation of the PaaS problem, we have not imposed variables N s to be integer, as in reality they are. In fact, requiring variables to be integer makes the solution much more difficult. Therefore, we consider the continuous relaxation of the problem.
However, experimental results have shown that if the optimal values of the variables are fractional and they are rounded to the closest integer solution, the gap between the solution of the real integer problem and the relaxed one is very small. This is a common assumption adopted in the literature [43] and is also intuitive for large scale data centers including thousands of servers.
We note that the objective function of the PaaS provider is linear and increasing with respect to variables β k which are bounded above by the constants α k /m k . Hence 
We note that the problem (9)- (12) is easy to solve because constraints (11)- (12) can be rearranged to obtain linear constraints with respect to N s so that each variable N s can be optimized separately. Hence the PaaS optimal solution is
provided that the sum of the right-hand sides does not exceed the upper bound N P ;
otherwise there is no feasible solution.
Game Formulation from the SaaS Side
The SaaS s optimization problem is:
The first terms of the payoff function compute the net revenues obtained from the execution of end-users' request. The second terms determine the penalties incurred with request rejections. Finally, the last term evaluates the response time R P k for WS application k requests according to the utility function established in the SLA between the SaaS and each end-user. Constraint family (15) states that X k cannot be larger than the actual arrival rate Λ k and smaller than the minimum admission rate λ k . Constraint family (16) entails that the response time for application k negotiated with the PaaS is smaller than R S k . As in the previous section, constraints (17) and (18) guarantee that the application response time satisfies the SLA and that physical servers are not saturated, respectively.
Generalized Nash Equilibria
The model resulting from the optimization problems described in the previous sections is a Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem with joint constraints, where the players are the PaaS and SaaS providers: The strategies of the PaaS provider are N = (N s ) s∈S , 13 the strategies of each SaaS provider s are X s = (X k ) k∈A s and R P s = (R P k ) k∈A s . Each SaaS provider shares constraints (17) and (18) with the PaaS provider.
In this setting, a Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE) is a set of strategies such that no player can improve its payoff function by changing its strategy unilaterally [26] , i.e. a GNE is a vector (X, R P , N) such that the following relations hold:
and for all s ∈ S
Potential function
Since (i) the payoff function Θ p of PaaS provider depends only on his own strategies N s , (ii) the payoff function Θ s of each SaaS provider s only depends on his own strategies X s and R P s , and (iii) constraints (17) and (18) are shared among the players, we can conclude that this game is a generalized potential game [27, 34] where the potential function is simply the sum of the players payoff functions. This potential function represents a social welfare for the game.
is a potential for the game.
We denote by Ω the feasible region containing the variables of all the players, i.e. (10), (11), (12) hold and (15)- (16) hold for all s ∈ S}.
Since this is a generalized potential game, we can assume that the potential Π is the payoff function of each player; therefore each global maximizer of Π on the set Ω, called social optimum, is a special Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE). In other words, social optima represent the GNE which are optimal from a social point of view.
Proposition 2. There exists at least one social optimum.
Proof. First, we prove that Ω is a closed set. For any (X, R P , N) ∈ Ω we have:
for all s ∈ S and k ∈ A s . Therefore we obtain that
hence in the definition of Ω we can replace constraints (12) with constraints (22), thus Ω is a closed set. Since Ω is also bounded and Π is continuous, the existence of social optima follows from the well-known Weierstrass theorem.
The Social Optimum Problem
The Cloud provisioning game is extremely challenging since the number of SaaS providers |S| and WS applications |A| characterizing problem instances of interest in practice are extremely large (i.e., hundreds of SaaS and thousands of applications [17] ).
In order to identify efficient solution methods, in this section we analyze the social optimum problem determining its main properties.
In particular, we will show that constraints (11) hold as equality in any social optimum and that the social optimum problem is convex. Furthermore, bounds relating the platform capacity, the energy costs and the penalties incurred in case of requests rejection will be identified for interesting system regimes.
Proposition 3. If (X, R P , N) is a social optimum, then the response time constraints (11) are all active, i.e.
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists an index k ∈ A s , for some s, such
If we slightly decrease the value of R P k , keeping fixed the values of the other variables, we obtain a new feasible vector (X, R P , N) such that Π(X, R P , N) > Π(X, R P , N), which is impossible.
It follows from Proposition 3 that the variables R P k can be expressed as function of X k and N s , hence the social optimum problem can be rewritten as follows:
Proposition 4. The social optimum problem (24)- (28) is convex.
Proof. We have to prove that the objective function is concave and all the constraints are convex. To this end, it is sufficient to show that the functions
are convex when constraints (28) are satisfied. Since all these functions have the same structure, we can consider only the function
where variables x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and y correspond to X s and N s respectively, and the constants a i > 0 and b > 0 to v sl /µ l and C respectively. Therefore, it is sufficient to prove that the function h is convex when b y − n i=1 a i x i > 0 (which corresponds to constraint (28) ).
The first derivatives of h are 2 ; the second derivatives of h are
Thus the Hessian matrix of h is
For any vector u = (u 1 , . . . , u n , u n+1 ) ∈ R n+1 we have
Therefore, if b y − n i=1 a i x i > 0, then the Hessian matrix of h is positive semidefinite and hence h is convex.
In the rest of this section we analyze the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) system of the social optimum problem and derive some bounds for the social optima relating the platform capacity, the energy costs and the penalties incurred in case of requests rejection.
Since the social optimum problem is convex and the Slater constraint qualification holds, the KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient for the optimality. If we denote L i k ≥ 0, for k ∈ A and i = 1, 2, 3, the KKT multipliers associated to constraints (25) and (26), and L 4 ≥ 0, the multiplier associated to constraint (27) , then the KKT system is the following:
constraints (25)- (28).
In the following we will analyze two limiting regimes for the Cloud system. In particular Proposition 5 considers that the system provides very good performance for a provider s (i.e., the constraints (26) are not active for the whole set of WS applications
A s hosted at the PaaS site), which corresponds to light load conditions for the SaaS s.
Vice versa, Proposition 6 considers the case a provider s is under heavy load and the minumum workload is served for every WS applications in A s . These results are used in Section 5 to identify the initial solution for our resource allocation algorithm, and, as it will be further discussed in Section 6, they allow to achieve the best efficiency in terms of PoA.
In the remainder of the paper, we will denote with
and we set Ω sk = v sk C/µ k .
Proposition 5. If (X, N) is a social optimum solution and there exists a SaaS provider s
such that X k = Λ k and the response time is strictly lower than R S k for all WS applications k ∈ A s , then:
Proof. Since for all k ∈ A s the constraint (26) is not active and X k = Λ k , we obtain
hence we have
Setting X l = Λ l and taking into account the equilibrium condition C N s − l∈A s v sl Λ l /µ l > 0, we obtain the first inequality of (35) .
On the other hand, it follows from (30) that
Setting X l = Λ l for all l ∈ A s , we get N) is a social optimum solution and there exists a SaaS provider s such that X k = λ k and the response time is strictly lower than R S k for all WS applications k ∈ A s , then
Proof. Since for all k ∈ A s the constraint (26) is not active and X k = λ k , we obtain
From (29) we obtain
Setting X l = λ l and taking into account the equilibrium condition C N s − l∈A s v sl λ l /µ l > 0, we obtain
On the other hand, from (30) we get
Setting X l = λ l for all l ∈ A s , we get
which, together with the equilibrium condition C N s − l∈A s v sl λ l /µ l > 0, implies
Finally, the thesis follows from (37) and (38).
Distributed Solution Method
In the previous Section it has been proved that the social optimum problem is convex and, from a theoretical point of view, it could be solved by the PaaS which has the full knowledge of system parameters (see Section 2). However, computational results demonstrate that only small instances can be solved to optimality with commercial nonlinear optimization packages (see Section 6). To handle representative problem sizes, in this Section we provide a solution algorithm which converges to a GNE. Several different versions of the algorithm we implemented are characterized by a different choice of the initial solution.
Before describing the solution algorithm, we analyze in more details the PaaS and SaaSs problems. In Section 3.1 we have shown that PaaS problem is easy to solve. On the other hand, the SaaS problem (14)- (18) can not be solved analytically, but it can be reformulated as a convex problem. In fact, we can prove similarly to Proposition 3 that constraints (17) are active in any SaaS optimal solution. Hence, the variables R P k can be expressed as function of X k by formula (23) and we can rewrite the SaaS problem as follows:
Finally, it can be proved that this problem is convex following the proof of Proposition 4. Now, we describe the solution algorithm and prove that it converges to a GNE.
Solution Algorithm
1. An initial value for the number of physical servers of each SaaS N s is identified.
2. If s∈S N s > N P , the PaaS provider reduces N s proportionally to constraint (10) violation, i.e. the PaaS sets
otherwise PaaS provider set N s = N s for all s ∈ S.
3. Given N, each SaaS provider s finds a optimal solution (X k ) k∈A s , of the convex optimization problem (39)- (42) and set
The algorithm performs three simple steps. An initial estimate for the number of physical servers is identified. If the initial server assignment is unfeasible, then the PaaS reallocates servers among SaaSs. Finally, each SaaS computes the optimal values for (X s , R P s ) accordingly to its objective. We can obtain many different versions of the algorithm according to the way and the players (SaaS or PaaS) that select the initial number of servers. We first prove that the solution algorithm converges to a GNE, then we formulate five alternative methods that will be evaluated in the next Section.
Proposition 7.
If N is such that the feasible region (40)-(42) of each SaaS provider is non-empty, then the vector (X, R P , N) found by the solution algorithm is a GNE.
Proof. Since each SaaS determines the best reply (X s , R P s ) to the PaaS strategy N, we obtain that all the constraints (17) are active. Thus, by formula (13) also the strategy N of the PaaS is the best reply to the strategies (X, R P ) of the SaaS players. Hence (X,
is a GNE because of relations (19)- (20) .
According to the previous result, the solution algorithm finds a GNE. However, the equilibrium is found in a single best reply dynamic iteration and depends on the arbitrary choice N at step 1. Hence, finding good equilibria for the problem under study could be hard. We have implemented the following heuristic methods for defining a vector N which provides a good equilibrium.
• Method 1: Each SaaS randomly selects N s at step 1. Random initialization at step 1 is considered as a benchmark for the comparison of alternative methods.
• • Method 3: At step 1, each SaaS s maximizes the function k∈A s (40)- (42), considering both X s and N s as decision variables.
• Method 4: At step 1, the PaaS sets
according to Proposition 5.
• Method 5: At step 1, the PaaS sets 
Numerical Results
The solution algorithm proposed has been evaluated for a variety of system and workload configurations. Section 6.1 is devoted to quantitatively analyze the efficiency of the equilibria achieved by our approach, while the scalability is discussed in Section 6.2. Finally, Section 6.3 illustrates the equilibria properties for a medium size system by varying application performance parameters.
Equilibria Efficiency
To evaluate the efficiency of our algorithm we have considered a very large set of randomly generated instances. The number of SaaS providers has been varied between 100 and 1,000, the number of applications (evenly shared among SaaSs) between 1,000 and 10,000 1 .
The performance parameters of the applications and infrastructural resources costs have been randomly generated uniformly in the ranges reported in Table 2 as in [8, 12, 31] , considering also real applications [11] , according to commercial fees applied by IaaS/PaaS Cloud providers [4, 33] and the energy costs available in the literature [28] .
We have included in the time unit cost c of a physical server also the overhead of the cooling system according to the values reported in [28] , varying also the cost of energy per kWh. Furthermore, the penalty values p k have been set proportional to the revenues for single request execution α k , p k = γ 1 k α k , where γ 1 k has been randomly generated uniformly in the range [5, 50] , as in [42] , while the upper bounds on the average response time thresholds guaranteed to the SaaS customers were set proportional to the request service demand 1/µ k , i.e., R S k = γ 2 k /µ k , where γ 2 k has been randomly generated uniformly in the range [100, 200] , as in [13] . Finally, since request rejection has an important impact on SaaS provider reputation, we set λ k = 0.95Λ k .
We denote with x any social optimum and with x the GNE found by the solution algorithm using methods 1-5. The efficiency has been measured in terms of the Price of Anarchy (PoA) evaluated as
The PoA is a measure of the inefficiency due to PaaS and SaaSs selfish behavior with respect to the scenario where the social optimum is pursued. The metric is lower or equal to 1 (the greater the better).
Random instances have been generated guaranteeing that the constraint (27) is active, which corresponds to the worst case situation for a Cloud system (heavy workload) and for the proposed methods which otherwise can determine the social optimum naively (e.g., if the servers are not saturated, PoA is always equal to 1 for method 3). This has been obtained by solving the social optimum problem with an infinite number of servers and then by setting N P equal to ρ times the total number of servers actually used. In order to evaluate the robustness of our solution, ρ has been set equal to 0.9, 0.8 and 0.7, which corresponds to increasing workload conditions for the PaaS.
Results are reported in Tables 3-5 Table 5 : Solution methods efficiency, ρ = 0.7.
Algorithms Scalability
The scalability of our approach has been evaluated performing tests on a VMWare virtual machine based on Ubuntu 11.04 server, running on an Intel Nehalem dual socket quad-core system with 32 GB of RAM. The virtual machine has a physical core dedicated with guaranteed performance and 4 GB of memory reserved. KNITRO 8.0 has been used as nonlinear optimization solver, which can exploit the multi-core architecture of our system. We have considered a very large set of randomly generated instances obtained as in the previous Section varying the model parameters according to the ranges reported in Table 2 . Table 6 reports the average execution time required by our methods for problem instances of different sizes. As in the previous Section, the average values reported in the Table 6 : Execution times (s).
Equilibria Sharing Analysis
The In particular, we considered three SaaSs offering five heterogeneous applications each. If not differently stated we set α k = 0.5 $/req, µ k = 10k req/s, m k = 1.5, c = 0.09 $/h, Λ k = 450 req/s, and δ s = 0.45 (i.e., we considered the midpoint of the random intervals reported in Table 2 ). For the sake of simplicity, we considered the following application to SaaS provider assignment A 1 = {1, . . . , 5}, A 2 = {6, . . . , 10}, A 3 = {11, . . . , 15}.
In the following we will vary one parameter at the time for the first application k = 1, while the parameters of the remaining ones will be held fixed. We will investigate how the parameter change will affect: (i) the throughput ratio of WS application 1, i.e., X 1 /Λ 1 , (ii) the throughput of the remaining applications for the first provider Figures 6-9 analyze how the GNE changes by varying application 1 maximum service rate µ 1 (the range [60, 510] req/s has been considered). If the maximum service rate increases, the service time required to process each WS application 1 request decreases and the overall capacity required to process WS application 1 decreases accordingly (Figures 8 and 9 ). Vice versa, application throughput is not affected (see As δ 1 increases, the metrics under analysis remain almost constant but change abruptly when δ 1 = 0.82 (see Figures 14-17) . For that value, the ratio X 1 /Λ 1 drops suddenly from 100% to 95% (the minimum achievable value), which is very unintuitive. 
Conclusions
We proposed a game-theoretic approach for the run-time management of a PaaS provider capacity among multiple competing SaaSs. The cost model consists of a class of utility functions which include revenues and penalties incurred depending on the achieved performance level and the energy costs associated with PaaS resources. the proposed solutions to consider multiple time-scales for performing resource allocation ranging from few minutes to one hour. Finally, the opportunity to allocate SaaS applications on multiple PaaS providers will be also investigated.
